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"THE ETHICS OF DISSENT AND FRIENDSHIP"-A
RESPONSE TO PROFESSOR SHAFFER
CARL M. SELINGER*
Tom Shaffer is, to my knowledge, the first legal scholar to assess the significance
for the practice of law of real friendships, not just metaphorical ones, between
lawyers and their clients.' But notwithstanding his interesting stories and his pioneer-
ing and worthwhile analysis, I would suggest that such friendships are probably
less common in fact and more problematic as an ideal for lawyer-client relations
than Shaffer would have us believe.
* Dean and Professor of Law, West Virginia University College of Law.
A precursor to his present article, Shaffer, The Ethics of Dissent and Friendship in the American
Professions, is Shaffer, 88 W. VA. L. REv. (1986). Christian Theories of Professional Responsibility,
48 S. CAL. L. Ray. 721, 725-27 (1975). The metaphor of friendship for lawyer-client relations is developed




Selinger: The Ethics of Dissent and Friendship--A Response to Professor Sha
Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1986
RESPONSE
Consider first the likelihood of friendships developing.
Midway through his article, Shaffer criticizes the "individualistic, liberal-
democratic, republican" view of professional relations for treating both profes-
sionals and their clients or patients as "fungible." 2 However, Shaffer himself fails
to acknowledge relevant and significant differences among lawyers. An important
sociological study of "role orientations" in the legal profession found that only
some lawyers are "people-oriented," in that they obtain professional satisfaction
mainly from feeling that they have helped clients as individuals; other lawyers are
more oriented to solving problems ("trial lawyers," "technicians," "business
organizers") or making money.'
Similarly, a major psychological study of first-year law students, employing
a widely used instrument based on the work of Carl Jung, revealed that a per-
sonality type that is "characterized as one who is concerned chiefly with people,
who values harmonious human contacts, [and] is friendly, tactful, sympathetic,
and loyal" is significantly underrepresented among law students as compared, for
example, with liberal arts undergraduates.' Some people are much more inclined
toward friendship than others, and that seems to hold true among individual lawyers
and, one would assume, individual clients.
There are also factors built into many lawyer-client relationships that are likely
to inhibit the formation of friendships. First, in the field of criminal defense, there
is the problem of the client's character. A sociologist's well-regarded analysis of
criminal lawyers' work concluded that,
Since he usually has been guilty of some crime (some previous crime, if not
the one with which he is currently charged), the client of the criminal lawyer is
typically an unreliable, dishonest person. Consequently, the status difference be-
tween attorney and client is disparate, taxing to the limit even the professionally
defined relationship that is designed to ameliorate this problem.
Second, there can be a feeling on the part of some clients who are involved
personally in legal disputes that having to employ a lawyer is just another aspect
of the same human injustice that the lawyer is supposed to rectify. That physicians
are more likely to be perceived by their patients as allies may have something to
do with a tendency to ascribe divine or deterministic origins to even medical prob-
lems with such calculable human causes as automobile accidents.
And third, the separation that can occur in a lawyer-client relationship between
taking actions (the lawyer's job), on one hand, and being satisfied that there are
2 Shaffer, THE E'Hics OF DISSENT AND FRIENDSHIP IN THE AMERICAN PROFESSIONS, 88 W. VA.
L. REV. 623, 654 (1986).
H. O'GORMAN, LAWYERS AND MATRIMONIAL CASES 120-32 (1963).
Miller, Personality Differences and Student Survival in Law School, 19 J. LEGAL ED. 460,
466 (1967).
1 A. WOOD, CRIMINAL LAWYER 250 (1967).
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adequate moral justifications for those actions (the client's responsibility) may lead
to real tensions and suspicions. Some lawyers will resent being required to act in
ways that injure third persons in circumstances in which the harms seem unjustified
to the lawyer and perhaps also to others in the community.
Meanwhile, some clients will be rather hesitant even to trust, much less like,
an attorney who shows few compunctions about harming third persons. An analogy
by Professors Dauer and Leff is interesting in this regard:
[Y]ou don't need to love your hammer, for lovability is not its essence; its aret6
is to hit, and hit well, and most important, to hit not oneself, but what you want
to hit. A hammer that is perfectly willing to hit you, and would, but for the fact
that you have bought it and thine enemy has not, may be used, but that is no
reason at all to lavish love on it. 6
Shaffer clearly does not expect every transaction between an attorney and client
to evolve into friendship, but he does appear to treat friendship as an ideal for
lawyer-client relations. And here, too, I have some reservations.
Along with many other contemporary critics of the professions, Shaffer ad-
vocates a "participatory" or "partnership" model of relations between professionals
and their clients or patients: in the case of lawyers, "the client should ... participate
in decisions on negotiation and trial strategy, choose witnesses, be given a second
professional opinion if he wants one, help set the fee, help decide what the lawyer
is to say to the world outside the law office." 7 That's very well, it seems to me,
if the client wants to be a partner in making such decisions, and the option should
be open to him or her without having to search interminably for a lawyer who
will say something more than, "Just leave it to me."
But what of the client or patient who has consulted a professional precisely
because he or she wants to stop worrying about his or her legal or health problems-
what of the person who wants to turn them over, lock, stock, and barrel, to a
doctor or lawyer? Why should that alternative not also be available to a client,
without constantly having to overcome even the well-intentioned desires of profes-
sionals for partners or friends who will continue to be responsible in the main for
their own legal or medical welfare?
This point can be put still more strongly. Shaffer says that a client's friend-
ship, interest in the lawyer's activities for the client, and ongoing willingness to
"contribute to the common effort" make the practice of law more stimulating and
make it seem more worthwhile." But this kind of client involvement can also become
something of a "pain in the neck" to a lawyer-perhaps because of the lawyer's
own personality, which we'll return to presently, but perhaps also because the lawyer
' DAUBR & LEFF, Correspondence: The Lawyer as Friend, 86 YALE L. J. 573, 582 n.38 (1977).
' Shaffer, supra note 2, at 663.
1 Id. at 651-52.
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senses accurately a certain unhealthy obsessiveness on the part of the client about
his or her legal problems. A client with such tendencies needs to be more realistic
with regard to what can and cannot be expected from legal services and the legal
system, and get on about his or her other business; he or she does not need an
emotionally fascinating attorney-client relationship.
In fact, a client's greatest need may not be for a friendly lawyer at all, but
rather for a lawyer whose role orientation or personality type makes him or her
particularly adept at office or courtroom problem-solving, business organizing,
logical thinking, or imaginative reasoning. Are we to understand Shaffer's remark
that, "Most doctors are not interested in attending funerals for their dead patients;
Ann Landers says they shouldn't be expected to," 9 as an invitation to those who
are not terribly sympathetic, and don't want to fake it, to pursue another line of
work?
The legal profession as a whole provides, to my mind, suitable employment
for persons with all manner of role orientations and personalities, and one of the
principal obligations of legal education is to help each student to understand how
his or her own strengths and weaknesses relate to the great variety of jasks that
lawyers perform. I hope that Shaffer means by his reference to funerals only that
friendship can be extremely valuable in certain kinds of practice and that no lawyer
should be deterred from expressing genuinely felt affection, or grief, by some kind
of artificial "code" of professional detachment.
Still, I think that Shaffer is too rough on the notion of lawyers' detachment,
when he treats it as principally a device through which establishment lawyers have
managed both to fool themselves into believing that they are not furthering the
interests of their friends'" at the expense of others, and to make ethnic lawyers
feel guilty about being emotionally committed to the representation of people in
their communities."
It seems to me that the ideas that a lawyer can divide his or her professional
life from his or her private life, that he or she is not obligated "to adopt a personal
viewpoint favorable to the interests or desires of his client,"' 2 that his or her represen-
tation of a client "does not constitute an endorsement of the client's political,
economic, social or moral views or activities,' ' 3 and that, "when a lawyer pur-
ports to act on behalf of the public, he should espouse only those [legislative or
administrative] changes which he conscientiously believes to be in the public
interest"' 4 are ideas that at different times in the past have helped to obtain effec-
Id. at 662.
° Id. at 643.
Id. at 636.
" MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY [EC] 7-17 (1969).
" MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.2(b) (1982).
" MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT EC 8-4 (1969).
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tive legal representation for the unpopular clients and causes, and for minorities,"
and have been conducive to more informed public decision-making. 6
The notion of lawyers' detachment, in the sense of professional independence,
is, I believe, a much more fragile ideal than those of friendship and communal
solidarity, and one that is much more in need of nurturing, in the interests of society
as a whole.
A COMMENT FOR TOM SHAFFER:
THE ETHICS OF RACE, THE ETHICS OF CORRUPTION
JAMEs J. FRIEDBERG*
Tom Shaffer does more than describe dissent. He endorses it. We know this
by the commentary that he interweaves with his narrative of the dissenting lawyers,
Fanny Holtzman and Jerry Kennedy. We know this still more by the approving,
even affectionate language with which he portrays these two lawyers. Sincerely af-
fectionate, although one of the two is a total stranger to him and the other is even
less-a creation of fiction. He endorses their dissent and he endorses their alter-
native ethic, as he sees it: that of the "immigrant" lawyer.
It is difficult for me to reject the lessons of Tom's homilies. Not only did
I intellectually share his regard for the values of community and friendship (which
are, as he implies, insufficiently influential in our profession and our society), but
I also feel a visceral, ethnic harmony with his theme of the salutary effects of the
immigrant community, of the importance of "going home". I grew up in that
Catholic/Jewish cultural millieu of which Tom writes. It shaped my values regard-
ing friends and decency. It also nurtured my intuitive skepticism regarding author-
ity. When I first heard Tom speak of "gentle cynicism", I immediately understood
what he meant, although I might not have been able to articulate it immediately.
Understanding what Tom means is made easier by the fact that he is not alienated
" See generally V. COUNTRYMAN, T. FINMAN & T. SCHNEYER, THE LAWYER IN MODERN SOCIETY
638-53 (2d ed. 1976).
6 The 1981 Proposed Final Draft of Model Rule 6.4 would have prohibited a lawyer from par-
ticipating in a decision of a law reform organization that "could have a direct material effect" on
a client. However, as such a prohibition would have prevented organizations seeking reform in specialized
fields like antitrust, tax, and securities law from taking advantage of the expertise of most practitioners
in those fields, the final version of the rule only requires that a lawyer disclose that a client might
be materially benefitted. PROPOSED MODEL RULES Rule 6.4 (1981).
* Associate Professor of Law, West Virginia University College of Law.
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